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Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice
and the Cost of Legal Services
EMERY G. LEE III*
The high cost of legal services presents a significant access-to-justice
problem. In this Article, I argue that this problem is actually two
distinct problems—one affecting primarily low- and moderateincome persons, and one affecting primarily deep-pocketed corporate
defendants. Because the problems are different, they are probably not
amenable to a single solution. Most significantly, the Article applies
Baumol’s “cost disease” to the rising cost of legal services, thus
placing the debate over rising legal costs in a wider economic
context.
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The inability of the unskilled litigant to prepare pleadings, conduct
adequate investigation, work with the rules of evidence, research
decisional law, or persuasively argue the case in court render fair and
expeditious disposition of most civil litigation virtually impossible.
—The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein1

I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Jack Weinstein has been active on the issue of access to justice for low- and moderate-income persons for a very long time. As Suffolk County Attorney in the 1960s, for example, he led the movement to
establish “Nassau County Legal Services, one of the first community
legal services ‘storefronts’ in the nation.”2 He managed to secure funding for the organization from the Kennedy Administration,3 but the
* Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center. Institutional affiliation provided for
identification purposes only. The views expressed in this Article represent those of the author and
not those of the Federal Judicial Center or any other entity within the judicial branch.
1. JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF
JACK WEINSTEIN 196 (2011) (quoting Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, All People are Entitled to the
Assistance of Lawyers in Civil as Well as Criminal Matters, Speech at the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York 3 (Mar. 30, 1976)).
2. Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
3. Id.

499

500

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:499

effort faced stiff opposition. Some opponents of the plan even attempted
to have Weinstein disbarred.4 But he prevailed and kept his license, of
course. As judge and then chief judge of the Eastern District of New
York in the 1980s, he often spoke and published on this issue.5 In addition, he set in motion a process to establish a panel of lawyers to
represent formerly self-represented persons on a voluntary basis, secured
funds to support the Eastern District Pro Bono Panel and the Eastern
District Civil Litigation Fund, and provided training for lawyers interested in representing low-income litigants.6 Much more could be said
about his efforts on this front in the years since.
This Article will discuss access to justice as a function of the cost
of civil litigation. Framing the issue in this way, justice as a function of
cost, it is worth noting that justice and cost are two of the three goals
referenced in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states: “These rules . . . should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in positing these three
goals to guide the construal and administration of the rules, however, do
not provide any framework or method for balancing the goals in the
event that they conflict.8 And it is very likely that the goals clash in a
significant percentage of cases. Once one concedes—as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do—that justice both costs money and takes
time, but also that time is money9 and that delay detracts from justice,
then the trade-offs among money, time, and justice become difficult to
resolve. Indeed, it is likely that one can strive to achieve two of the goals
but rarely all three at the same time. Thus, it is easy to imagine a rules
regime in which there are speedy and inexpensive determinations of
matters that are far from just. Or a rules regime in which there are
speedy and just outcomes that are quite expensive. It is the third combination of the goals that is harder to imagine: inexpensive and just, but
not speedy.
4. Id. at 53.
5. See id. at 195.
6. See id. at 197.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
8. Cf., e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 327–34, 340 (2008) (calling for substantive theory to guide rulemakers in
designing effective rules).
9. In litigation, time is indeed money. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING,
LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5, 7 (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf (finding that, all else equal, a 1% increase in
disposition time was associated with a .32% increase in costs for plaintiffs and a .26% increase in
costs for defendants).
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To the empirical researcher, the three goals of Rule 1 also present a
measurement problem. One of the goals is ridiculously easy to measure;
“speedy” must be closely related to disposition time, so it can be measured simply as time from filing to final resolution. Time to disposition
is an important metric that the courts often use to gauge performance.10
Another of the goals, justice, is almost impossible to measure in an
objective fashion, especially across a broad range of cases.11 That leaves
a third goal that seems possible to measure—the cost of litigation. As
anyone who has ever tried to study the cost of litigation will tell you,
though, it is a very difficult thing to do well.12 For one thing, the ultimate information is in the hands of the parties to the litigation, and asking attorneys, although relatively common, has its limits. And the parties
themselves may not actually know the total cost of the litigation in
which they are involved.13 There is also disagreement among researchers whether to use dollars—or estimated dollars—or some other measure of cost, such as attorney hours.14
In 2009, my colleague Tom Willging and I released a report on
attorney estimates of litigation costs in a large, nationwide sample of
attorneys of record in recently closed cases in federal district court.15 We
found, consistent with a long line of previous studies, that most cases in
federal court have relatively modest costs.16 Plaintiffs’ attorneys
10. For example, the federal courts issue an annual Federal Court Management Statistics
report that includes, among other measures, median disposition times. For the most recent report,
as of this writing, see Federal Court Management Statistics, District Courts, U.S. CTS. (Mar.
2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/district-courtsmarch-2014.aspx.
11. It is worth noting, however, that legal practitioners tend to rate the civil justice produced
by the federal courts quite high. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 68–70, figs.42 & 44 (2009) [hereinafter LEE
& WILLGING, CIVIL RULES SURVEY], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/FJC%20National%20Case-Based%20Civil%20Rules%
20Survey.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil
Litigation, 20 NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS. 1, 1 (Jan. 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (“Complaints about litigation costs
have likely existed for as long as the legal profession, but those costs are extremely difficult to
measure.”).
13. One of the surprising things revealed in the lead-up to the 2010 Civil Litigation
Conference (“2010 Duke Conference”), held at the Duke Law School, was that few large
corporations had consistent and reliable information on their own litigation costs. See 2010 Civil
Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/
projects-rules-committees/2010-civil-litigation-conference.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
14. See id. (criticizing use of attorney estimates of costs and proposing an alternative method
of cost estimation based on the amount of time expended by attorneys).
15. See generally LEE & WILLGING, CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11.
16. See id. at 35–37, tbls.4 & 5.
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reported median costs of $15,000, and defendants’ attorneys reported
median costs of $20,000.17 Presenting these findings, Willging and I
were consistently told that we had to be wrong, that litigation costs are
much, much higher than that.18 Then, though, the New York Times cited
our report for a different proposition: that the costs of litigation that we
had reported were out-of-reach for most low- and moderate-income
Americans:
Pursuing a civil action in federal court costs an average of $15,000,
the Federal Judicial Center reported last year. Cases involving scientific evidence, like medical malpractice claims, often cost more than
$100,000. Some people cannot afford to pursue claims; others are
overwhelmed by corporate defendants with deeper pockets.19

The same reported costs could be both too high and too low. Costs that
would seem negligible to a corporate general counsel can present serious
access to justice issues to low- and moderate-income Americans. Of
course, this is a fact that we have known for a long time. As Bryant
Garth pointed out in 1998:
The recent studies of civil discovery by the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice and the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) establish beyond any
reasonable doubt that we have two very distinct worlds of civil discovery. These worlds involve different kinds of cases, financial
stakes, contentiousness, complexity and—although not the subject of
these studies—probably even lawyers. The ordinary cases, which
represent the overwhelming number, pass through the courts relatively cheaply with few discovery problems. The high-stakes, highconflict cases, in contrast, raise many more problems . . . . It is therefore essential to understand the distinction and to try to explain why it
operates.20

These “two very distinct worlds of civil discovery” actually present two
17. Id.
18. The empirical legal researcher must always remember the advice of Maurice Rosenberg,
one of the pioneers of the field:
No matter how carefully the facts or data are gathered to respond to the pivotal
questions, there will be great trouble in penetrating made-up minds. Commonly,
lawyers, lawmakers, and judges treat systematic data with casual disdain, preferring
individualized experience and intuition that they can encapsulate in a war story.
Their reaction to systematically gathered data is very often either “It’s obvious!” or
“It’s wrong!” depending on whether it squares with their own viewpoint or
experience.
Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989). At Duke, I was often told, “It’s wrong!”
19. Binyamin Applebaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all.
20. Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 597 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
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separate problems. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these
problems as the Little Guy’s problem and the Big Guy’s problem. Part II
of this Article describes these problems in some detail. In sum, the Little
Guy’s problem is the increasing cost of civil litigation; he is being
priced out of the market for legal services. The Big Guy’s problem is too
much information and, thus, too much discovery. Part III of the Article
links the ongoing debates about litigation costs and discovery to a
broader context. It is interesting that at the same time preparations for
the 2010 Duke Conference were underway, the United States was
embroiled in a much more visible controversy over costs—the cost of
health care. But almost no one made the connection. I do so here, using
an economic theory—Baumol’s cost disease21—rarely referenced in
legal literature. The cost disease, I argue, is at the heart of the Little
Guy’s problem, but much less central to the Big Guy’s problem. This
observation suggests that the solutions to the Little Guy’s and Big Guy’s
problems must be different. The conclusion offers a few brief comments
on potential solutions to the Little Guy’s problem.
II.

PROBLEMS

Access to civil justice is largely a problem because of the rising
cost of legal services. But what many fail to recognize, or perhaps refuse
to recognize, is that there are actually two, very different sets of
problems related to the cost of litigation.22
A.

The Little Guy

The Little Guy’s problem is simply that he cannot afford to
purchase legal services.23 A potential plaintiff with a large enough and
strong enough claim may be able to find an attorney to handle the case
on a contingency fee.24 Just how strong a claim must be, and how large
the potential damages must be, is an interesting (empirical) question.
21. See infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
22. Cf. Garth, supra note 20, at 597 (“One of the challenges for researchers is to get beyond
the information that tends to be produced by the elite lawyers themselves or by lawyers and
journalists parroting those lawyers.”).
23. By legal services, of course, I primarily mean an attorney’s fee: “Our data indicate that in
the ‘typical’ case, lawyers’ fees constitute virtually the entire out-of-pocket costs (regardless of
whether the disputant is an individual or an organization).” Herbert M. Kritzer et al.,
Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The Case of the Hourly-Fee Lawyer, 1984 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 559, 561 (1985).
24. For brevity’s sake, the remainder of this discussion will omit statutory fee awards.
“Almost 200 civil statutes authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs and, in some cases,
prevailing defendants.” ALAN HIRSH & DIANE SHEEHY, AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 1 (2d ed. 2005), available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/
attfees2.pdf.
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The work of Professor Herbert M. Kritzer on contingency fee legal practice is illuminating.25 Kritzer surveyed Wisconsin plaintiffs’ attorneys
who accept clients on a contingency fee basis to study, in part, how they
screen potential clients.26 Interestingly, he found that the most common
reason (47%) these attorneys provided for rejecting a potential client
was lack of liability on the part of the potential defendant(s).27 Respondents identified “inadequate damages” as only the second most common
reason for rejecting a potential client, at 19%.28 This is particularly surprising when taking into account the small damage awards that the
plaintiffs’ lawyers in this study were willing to pursue. Kritzer found a
median case valuation for cases filed but not going to trial of $40,000 at
the high end and $15,000 at the low end.29 For all cases, weighted by
disposition, the median value of cases in the study was $30,000.30 Given
that the typical contingency fee is 33%,31 plaintiffs’ lawyers were willing to file many cases promising a fee of $5,000 (one-third of $15,000)
and valued the “typical” case at a $10,000 fee (one-third of $30,000).
The value of cases varied by type, with medical malpractice (median
$500,000 at the high end) and products liability (median $175,000 at the
high end) offering higher potential damage awards.32 In general,
Kritzer’s respondents tended to take claims of relatively modest size—
i.e., Little Guy problems. But even then, many of the Little Guys contacting these plaintiffs’ attorneys were turned away, with an overall
acceptance rate for all contacts of 49%.33
Kritzer’s monograph suggests that about half of all potential clients
who contact a contingency fee attorney are turned away. The resulting
decision is either to proceed pro se or to forego the claim. The New York
Times editorialized about this “justice gap” in 2011: “Most low-income
Americans cannot afford a lawyer to defend their legal interests, no matter how urgent the issue. Unless they are in a criminal case, most have
no access to help from government-financed lawyers either.”34 The
result is that low-income Americans often turn to self-representation:
In civil proceedings like divorces, child support cases, home foreclo25. See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).
26. See id. at 26–27.
27. Id. at 85 tbl.3.9(a).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 38 tbl.2.3.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 39 tbl.2.4 (showing 60% of fee arrangements as “Flat one-third”).
32. Id. at 38 tbl.2.3.
33. Id. at 72 tbl.3.6.
34. Editorial, Addressing the Justice Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.ny
times.com/2011/08/24/opinion/addressing-the-justice-gap.html.
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sures, bankruptcies and landlord-tenant disputes, the number of people representing themselves in court has soared since the economy
soured. Experts estimate that four-fifths of low-income people have
no access to a lawyer when they need one. Research shows that litigants representing themselves often fare less well than those with
lawyers. This “justice gap” falls heavily on the poor, particularly in
overburdened state courts.35

There is indeed some evidence that the state courts have experienced an
increase in pro se litigants.36 However, pro se filings have not significantly increased in the federal courts in recent years, at least as a percentage of the civil docket.
FIGURE 1: PRO SE PLAINTIFFS AS A PERCENTAGE
1999–201337
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35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Judges Say Litigants Are Increasingly Going Pro Se—at Their
Own Peril, A.B.A. J. (July 12, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judges_say_liti
gants_increasingly_going_pro_se—at_their_own_ (reporting results of an ABA survey of state
trial judges). Some of this increase may be because of the economic downturn in 2008. See ABA
COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS 10 tbl.2 (2010), available at http://www.abajour
nal.com/files/Coalition_for_Justice_Report_on_Survey.pdf (showing that 60% of state trial judges
reported that the number of unrepresented parties had increased because of the economic
downturn).
37. Figure 1 was generated using the federal courts’ civil Integrated Data Base (“IDB”),
hosted by the Federal Judicial Center. See ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. The percentage of
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According to the IDB, non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs accounted for
8% of civil filings in 1999 and 9% in 2013; during the entire period, it
peaks at 11% in 2012. In terms of absolute numbers, non-prisoner pro se
filings increased by 65% between 1999 and 2013. In 1999, there were
12,415 non-prisoner filings involving a pro se plaintiff; in 2013, there
were 20,576. The non-pro se docket increased 50%. So there has been
an increase, but nothing that can be described as an explosion in pro se
litigation in the federal courts. Even without an explosion, though,
20,576 cases is a lot.
Non-prisoner pro se litigants appear in around 10% of federal
cases. Not surprisingly, slightly more than half of the pro se filings were
in the civil rights category (e.g., Section 1983 lawsuits,38 Bivens
actions,39 employment discrimination,40 and Americans with Disabilities
Act cases41). Civil rights cases are, of course, a large part of the federal
docket. This category represents 14% of represented filings, and is thus
the third-largest category amongst represented filings. But the “typical”
pro se filer in federal court is a civil-rights plaintiff. Interestingly, torts
cases make up the plurality of the represented cases, at 31%, which may
reflect the growing multidistrict litigation products liability docket.42
Contracts cases make up another 17% of the represented cases, compared to just 5% for the pro se filings. Together torts and contracts make
non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs was calculated by summing the observed values for pro se plaintiff
only cases and pro se plaintiff and defendant cases but excluding the small number of pro se
defendant-only cases. For the non-prisoner numbers, I excluded the nature of suit codes generally
associated with prisoner litigation (510–555), but it is likely that a very small number of prisoner
cases were miscoded (440) and thus included in the non-prisoner series. I included the line for all
pro se plaintiffs to provide a sense for the volume of prisoner litigation in the federal courts. Most
years, fifteen percent of all federal civil filings are filed by incarcerated persons. From 1999
through 2013, there were more than 800,000 prisoner cases filed in federal district court. These
cases account for more than seventy percent of all pro se filings. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, ICPSR STUDY Nos. 34881 (2014), 33622
(2013), 30401 (2012), 4382 (2012), 25002 (2012), 22300 (2011), 4685 (2011), 4382 (2013), 4348
(2011), 4026 (2012), 4059 (2012), 3415 (2012), 8429 (2012). All FJC data sets are available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/00072/studies?archive=NACJD&sortBy=7.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing the ability to bring a civil action against a state
actor for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities”).
39. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971) (holding that a cause of action exists for a violation of one’s Fourth Amendment
rights).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (detailing “unlawful employment practices”).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012) (declaring that the purpose of the act is “to ensure that
the Federal Government plays a central role” in policing “discrimination against individuals with
disabilities”).
42. For a detailed examination of the growth of multidistrict litigation, see Thomas E.
Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate
Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010).
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up about half (48%) of the represented filings but only 17% of the pro se
filings.
FIGURE 2: NON-PRISONER PRO SE FILINGS COMPARED TO NONPRISONER REPRESENTED FILINGS, BY NATURE OF SUIT
CATEGORY, 1999–201343
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I included a few additional categories in Figure 2 after examining
an earlier iteration of the “Other” category—Social Security appeals,
bankruptcy appeals, intellectual property, and Labor (mostly Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”) cases). Not surprisingly, intellectual property cases
account for a small percentage of the pro se filings, and the presence of a
specialized FLSA bar can be inferred from the 9% of the represented
federal docket that these cases comprise. Social Security appeals account
for about the same percentage of the pro se and represented filings—
although they comprise a slightly larger share of the represented
docket.44 Generally, I would not break out bankruptcy appeals into its
own category, but it does account for 3% of the pro se filings during the
43. Using the civil IDB data on filings from 1999–2013, and excluding prisoner filings,
Figure 2 compares these filings based on nature of suit category.
44. Remember that all categories of non-prisoner filings are much more likely to be
represented than pro se, so it is not informative to say that Social Security appeals are “more likely
to be represented than pro se.”
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study period. Finally, it is worth noting that the “Other” category here
includes, and this is especially true for represented cases, many of the
most-discussed kinds of federal cases—securities and antitrust, most
prominently. Those cases tend to feature Big Guy problems, to which I
now turn.
B.

The Big Guy

The Big Guy is a deep-pocketed corporation, for the most part. Its
problem is that it can afford legal services, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys
suing it know this. These plaintiffs’ attorneys either represent a plaintiff
with a substantial claim, a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, or a large
inventory of clients with similar claims, but who are not certifiable as a
class. The liberal discovery rules in federal court mean that the opportunities for discovery are ample, especially with the advent of electronic
discovery. The incidence of the “leveraged” settlement is certainly exaggerated,45 but no one doubts that there is some level of discovery abuse
in the system. My own research suggests that approximately 2 to 3% of
civil cases settle because of the costs of discovery; however, increasing
discovery costs do clearly affect settlement decisions, even when they
are not the “but for” cause of settlement.46
In the recent hearings before the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, several representatives of major corporations testified generally
in support of the proposed amendments. How did they describe their
problems?
Donald Lough, the assistant general counsel for the Ford Motor
Company, testified in Dallas, Texas. Mr. Lough stated that Ford has
approximately 10,000 new disputes per year, and therefore it must have
a “fair and efficient” system for resolving those disputes.47 The focus of
45. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551–52 (2010) (“This system incentivizes abusive discovery
tactics that can provide a competitive advantage. Such tactics include coercing a settlement by
increasing an opponent’s costs through unnecessary information requests and compelling an
opponent to produce confidential, proprietary, or embarrassing information.”). Of course, the
urtext must be Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989).
46. LEE & WILLGING, CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 32–33, fig.19. Judge
Weinstein, in critiquing this definition of discovery abuse, wrote: “This type of abuse may well
occur, but . . . litigation is so complex that without empirical data we cannot say that the myriad
incentives actually produce this behavior in any substantial number of cases.” Jack B. Weinstein,
What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 649, 654 (1989). I leave it to the reader to gauge whether two to three percent of civil cases
is a “substantial number.”
47. Donald Lough, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Ford Motor Co., Testimony at Public Hearing on
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules 248 (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/public-hearings/civil-hearing-transcript-2014-02-07.pdf.
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the bulk of his comments was on the problem of “over discovery,”48 and
the proposed amendments to Rule 26.49
Bradford Berenson, who described his job as being “in charge of
litigation for the General Electric Company,”50 expanded on similar
themes but focused more on the preservation issues and Rule 37. General Electric (“GE”), he testified, is “involved at any given moment in
time in literally thousands of civil cases all across the world.”51 Mr.
Berenson provided some truly staggering numbers: “We have the largest
Outlook email system in the world. There are 450,000 unique mailboxes
across 141 servers in eight global locations, so we know a thing or two
about the complexity, difficulty, burden and expense of trying to manage
preservation and discovery.”52 To provide “a somewhat richer factual
record,” Mr. Berenson gave a concrete example of the preservation and
production issues involved in GE’s complex cases:
My predecessor back at the Duke mini conference in [2010]
went through three specific examples of cases, and one thing that we
did in preparation . . . was to update those three examples . . . .
The second of the three examples he provided, . . . he reported
that we had spent $5 million to preserve and collect documents from
250 unique custodians.
Three years later, today, those . . . custodians have become 815
across the [European Union] and the United States where the documents were preserved. [For] four hundred fifteen of these custodians,
there has actually been a collection of documents, and ultimately documents were produced to the other side from only 85, or about 10
percent, of those whose documents were originally preserved.
Of the documents produced there are 340,000 unique documents, 6 million pages. When the case finally reached trial all of the
documents fit in a couple of binders that both sides designated and
used as exhibits. There were 194 of those.
So .1 percent of the documents that were actually produced at
the end of this huge funnel actually found their way into trial, and
were documents that one side or the other considered necessary to the
accurate determination of the case in a court of law.
The overall cost over seven years of discovery in that case, $22
48. Id. (“[T]oo often discovery causes delays, drives up costs, and actually impedes trials.”).
49. See id. at 250–52 (The “proportionality requirements of Rule 26 . . . are in great need of
strengthening and enforcement.”).
50. Brad Berenson, Gen. Elec. Co., Testimony at Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
111–12 (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
public-hearings/civil-hearing-transcript-2014-02-07.pdf.
51. Id. at 112.
52. Id.
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million.53

Mr. Berenson described another case in which GE has spent
approximately $11 million on discovery, but in which “[thei]r best most
objective good faith assessment of the fair settlement value of this case
is $4 million.”54 Mr. Berenson’s testimony includes a definition of nuisance settlements from the perspective of the Big Guy: “nuisance value
nowadays can mean multi-million dollar settlements.”55
The Big Guy can bury you with big numbers, but that’s in the
nature of the Big Guy. A more difficult question is how to put these
large numbers into context. The cases described by Mr. Berenson and
other representatives of large corporations are clearly not “inexpensive”
in any meaningful sense of the word—setting aside, for a moment, the
issue of discovery abuse. But compared to the resources of a global corporation like GE, how expensive is this litigation? One point of frustration I had at the 2010 Duke Conference is that the law-trained mind
seems to have difficulty dealing with numbers—large numbers, in particular. A report submitted by Lawyers for Civil Justice, and others,
made quite a statement: “Among the 36 survey participants who
[reported aggregate costs], the total aggregate spen[t] on litigation in
2008 was $4.1 billion.”56 Of course, aggregate numbers are just that. If a
major corporation like Ford has 10,000 new disputes a year, the aggregate cost of those disputes will be a substantial sum. Moreover, the
report as a whole did put the litigation costs into context. The report
showed that respondent companies’ litigation costs averaged less than
one percent of the companies’ annual U.S. revenues.57 The Big Guy’s
problem in a nutshell: major corporations are spending billions on litigation out of trillions in revenue.
As the brief excerpts from the recent hearings make clear, the Big
Guy wants less discovery in civil litigation. Thus, those representing the
interests of major corporations back rules amendments to limit discovery. This is not a new phenomenon. Discovery abuse as a concept has
been with us a very long time. In 1958, Professor Rosenberg wrote that
“courts are conscious that federal discovery is often used abusively,
sometimes deliberately so. Abuses take the form of running up expenses,

53. Id. at 113–14.
54. Id. at 115.
55. Id. at 116.
56. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 4
(2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materi
als/Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies.pdf.
57. Id. at 10 fig.6.
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[and] delay . . . .”58 Discovery abuse was a problem addressed by the
Pound Conference, in 1976, before anyone but the most farsighted was
discussing preservation of electronically stored information.59 Professor
Richard Marcus, longtime reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules on discovery issues, published an article entitled Discovery Containment Redux in 1998.60 The first sentence of that article? “Here we go
again.”61 As the former chair of the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judge Lee Rosenthal, has pointed out:
“The discovery rules have been revised more frequently than any other
section” of the civil rules.62 Many, if not most, of these rules amendments have been targeted at limiting—or, in Marcus’s more neutral
term, containing63—discovery.
III.

THE COST DISEASE: HEALTH CARE

AND

LEGAL SERVICES

Any discussion of litigation costs should take into account the work
of economist William J. Baumol and his dreaded “cost disease.”64 In
work dating back to the 1960s, Baumol has argued that the post-Industrial Revolution economy can be roughly divided into two sectors. In
one sector, massive productivity gains are achieved through the actions
of “inventors and entrepreneurs” (“the progressive sector”).65 The progressive sector “has all but eliminated famine in wealthy countries, created technology unimaginable in earlier eras, given us ever-rising
standards of living, and greatly reduced poverty in both extent and
severity.”66 In the other sector (“the stagnant sector”), productive gains
have been made but, relative to the more productive progressive sector,
the productivity gains are insignificant.67
Economic activities in the stagnant sector tend to be activities that
58. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480,
495 (1958).
59. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, Epilogue to THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 289 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)
(noting “growing concern over what many perceived to be abusive and overly extensive discovery
procedures”).
60. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 747 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and
the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
63. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 60, at 747, 748, 753.
64. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COMPUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH
CARE DOESN’T (2012).
65. See id. at 5 (“This unprecedented productivity growth [has been] carried out primarily by
the partnership of inventors and entrepreneurs and expanded to a large scale by companies,
governments, and non-profits . . . .”).
66. Id. at 5.
67. See id. at 20–22 (explaining that a “new production process” may allow a factory to
realize significant gains in productivity, whereas the only way to meaningfully increase output in a
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have so far proven difficult to mechanize or automate, and often involve
what might be called “‘personal services,’ which usually require direct,
face-to-face interaction between those who provide the service and those
who consume it. Doctors, teachers, and librarians all have jobs that
require in-person contact.”68
The cost disease results from the different growth rates in
productivity:
When growing productivity raises wages throughout the economy, it should be clear how differing productivity growth rates lead
to rising real costs in some industries and relatively declining real
costs in others. Take, for example, manufacturing—if wages in this
sector rise by 2 percent, the cost of manufactured products need not
rise because increased output per worker offsets the higher wages. In
contrast, the nature of many personal services makes it very difficult
to introduce labor-saving devices. A 2 percent wage increase for
teachers or police officers is not offset by higher productivity and
therefore must lead to equivalent increases in municipal budgets. A 2
percent wage increase for hairdressers must lead beauty salons to
raise their prices.
In the long run, wages for all workers throughout a country’s
economy tend to go up and down together. Otherwise, an activity
whose wage rate falls seriously behind will tend to lose its labor
force. Auto workers and police officers will see their wages rise at
roughly the same rate in the long run, but if productivity on the
assembly line advances while productivity in the patrol car does not,
then the cost of police protection will increase—relative to manufacturing. Over several decades, the two sectors’ differing cost growth
rates add up, making personal services enormously more expensive
than manufactured goods.69

Over time, accumulated productivity gains in the progressive sector
and lagging gains in the stagnant sector, coupled with a general increase
in wages across both sectors, mean that modern economies spend a
growing percentage of their wealth on personal services. This is a major
reason, Baumol posits, that health care costs are rising not just in the
United States but in other developed countries, regardless of whether
health care is distributed by private markets or government agencies, or
some combination of the two.70
The cost disease is an explanation for cost increases in the stagnant
“personal service” business, such as a doctor’s office, is to increase the labor hours dedicated to
the service—or perhaps decrease the quality of the service being provided).
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 21–22.
70. See id. at 9–12. “The universality and persistence of the problem—the fact that it has
endured for more than four decades and affects countries throughout Europe, North America, and
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sectors, but Baumol is careful to distinguish between cost levels and cost
increases.71 Health care offers a useful illustration:
[T]he disease condemns the costs of health-care and other services to
rise at a disturbingly rapid rate in all countries in which productivity
is growing rapidly. As long as productivity growth continues, these
growth rates will not slow down.
But although the growth rates are beyond our control, the data
for the different affected countries do show that the level of healthcare costs can be restrained. Many countries have costs much lower
than ours, even if they are still increasing just as quickly. Certainly it
would be a good thing if health-care spending in the United States
could be reduced to much lower levels.72

In short, while the cost disease is largely unavoidable, it does not foreclose meaningful reform of cost levels. Indeed, Baumol advocates several reforms that could reduce the levels of health care spending in the
United States, including better measurement of the effectiveness of various treatments,73 avoidance of unnecessary treatments,74 and greater use
of preventive medicine.75
Baumol has written much less about legal services, but the application of the cost disease to legal services is clear. Legal services are
decidedly in the stagnant sector: “the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ price
index for legal services suggests that between 1986 and 2008 lawyers’
fees outpaced inflation by about 1.5 percent each year.”76 Although the
modern law office, with its computers and access to court through electronic filing, would look like magic to Daniel Webster, the differences in
legal practice between Webster’s time and our own are not as great as
the productivity gains in other areas. Thus, we pay much less for some
things and more for legal services.
The cost disease is relevant to both the Big Guy’s problems and the
Little Guy’s problems. In relation to the former, it is likely that the cost
disease is part of the explanation for the repeated “failures” of previous
rules amendments to end complaints about discovery abuse in the federal courts. Although I am not aware of any reliable data on the subject,
Asia—indicate that its roots go far deeper than America’s particular administrative or institutional
arrangements.” Id. at 12.
71. See id. at 154–55 (“It is important to emphasize the distinction between the current
magnitude of health costs and the speed with which those costs are rising.”). Further, note that
“[o]f these two attributes, cost levels and cost increases, the cost disease deals only with the
latter.” Id. at 155.
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id. at 156.
74. Id. at 158.
75. Id. at 166.
76. Id. at 28.
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it is very likely that major U.S. corporations have found themselves
spending more and more on litigation, especially compared to falling
costs in other parts of their operations.77 This has led them in turn to put
pressure on the law firms that provide legal services to cut costs, making
those firms less profitable.78 In addition, it has led them, and groups
representing their interests, to advance proposals to address the perceived causes of these rising costs—discovery abuse, most prominently.
But still, the Big Guy’s problems are probably more related to the levels
of permissible discovery than to increasing costs per se.
In relation to the Little Guy, the cost disease is his problem.79 As
discussed above, in general, it is not the levels, or amount, of discovery
that keep the Little Guy out of court.80 Most of the Little Guy’s cases are
not going to be discovery-heavy, and reforms designed to reduce discovery levels are unlikely to help the Little Guy.81 A long line of empirical
inquiry suggests that, for the Little Guy, discovery costs are not a major
driver of the cost of litigation. Legal services may cost too much for the
Little Guy, but discovery is not the primary reason why.82 The 1960s
Columbia Project study estimated discovery costs at 19 to 36% of total
litigation costs, depending on whether the party was only requesting or
requesting-and-producing in discovery.83 The 1970s Civil Litigation
Research Project estimated that, in ordinary litigation, 16.7% of attorney
time (their measure of cost) was spent on discovery.84 The 1990s RAND
Corporation study reported that “lawyer work hours on discovery are
77. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 45, at 563 (“The advent of electronic discovery has
significantly raised the stakes in discovery abuse. . . . These developments have pushed discovery
[costs] to the forefront of litigation concerns for American businesses.”) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law: You Can’t Imagine the Terror When
the Money Dries Up, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 2013, at 24, 26–27 (“The most profitable partners
steadily discarded their underachieving colleagues, because they didn’t want to share the
spoils. . . . The overwhelming majority of these [‘Big Law’ firms] still operate according to a
business model that assumes, at least implicitly, that clients will insist upon the best legal talent
instead of the best bargain for legal talent.”).
79. One feature of Baumol’s argument that rings true here is that, when personal services
become too expensive, the alternative is often a form of “do-it-yourself.” See BAUMOL, supra note
64, at 40. The increase in pro se litigants, then, is a symptom of the cost disease.
80. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
81. See Kritzer, supra note 23, at 593–94 (“[T]he important implication of our analysis is that
the impact of discovery reform or discovery restrictions would be relatively modest in most cases
filed in our courts; major impacts would occur only for that very small number of cases in which
what might be characterized as ‘discovery wars’ occur.”) (footnote omitted).
82. The remainder of this paragraph draws heavily on Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–80
(2010), which summarizes the same literature.
83. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 180 tbl.43
(1968).
84. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91
tbl.3 (1983).
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zero for 38 percent of general civil cases, and low for the majority of
cases,” such that discovery was “not a pervasive litigation cost problem
for the majority of cases.”85 Analyzing just those civil cases with disposition times greater than 270 days, post-filing discovery accounted for
just over a third (36%) of attorney work hours, RAND found.86 Indeed,
the highest estimate of discovery costs as a share of total litigation costs
is found in a 1997 FJC report—the median estimate of the surveyed
attorneys was 50% for both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys.87
These findings make a lot of sense. For one thing, lawyers working
on a contingency fee have little incentive to engage in unnecessary discovery. Here’s how one plaintiffs’ attorney put it at the fall 2013 hearing
on the proposed rules amendments:
I get paid a percentage of what my client receives, if anything. When
I take a deposition, I don’t get paid by the hour. In fact, I pay the
expenses of the deposition out of my own pocket. I have zero incentive to take unnecessary depositions. Likewise, once I get the information I need in deposition, I have no incentive to take an extra
minute of deposition, much less fill up seven hours. If the proposed
rule changes are intended to stop contingency fee attorneys from conducting unnecessary discovery, don’t bother. Economics already
does.88

“Economics already does.” The Little Guy has simply been priced out of
the market for legal services. Reducing discovery levels is unlikely to
solve this problem.
IV.

CONCLUSION: LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS

If I am right, and the Little Guy and the Big Guy have very different problems, then the solutions to those problems must also be different. Perhaps some calibration of discovery levels can mitigate the
discovery costs experienced by the Big Guys. But, as I have argued,
such solutions are unlikely to address the Little Guy’s problems. Moreover, Baumol’s cost disease seems to suggest that the problem of
increasing costs will continue to worsen. In one of the more sobering
passages in Baumol’s book, he writes:
85. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA xx (1998), available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR941.html.
86. Id. at xxi tbl.S.2.
87. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 tbl.4 (1998).
88. Altom M. Maglio, Testimony at Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 28 (Nov. 7,
2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/public-hearings/
civil-hearing-transcript-2013-11-07.pdf.
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A disturbing moral of the story is that the products most vulnerable to
the cost disease include some of the most vital attributes of civilized
communities: health care, education, the arts, police protection, and
street cleaning, among others. All of these services [Author: and one
could easily include legal services] suffer from cost increases that are
both rapid and persistent. They threaten the strained budgets of families, municipalities, and central governments . . . . As financial stringency inevitably becomes more pressing, spending on these services
is apt to be cut back or, at best, increased by amounts that are barely
sufficient to stay abreast of overall inflation. As a result, the supply of
these services may fall in both quantity and quality.89

What, then, is to be done?
There is a growing literature on “civil Gideon,”90 the view that
there is a constitutional right to legal representation in civil litigation,
paralleling the right in criminal proceedings established in Gideon v.
Wainwright.91 Given the current political environment, any large-scale
move92 to civil Gideon seems extremely unlikely.93 Similarly, any substantial increase in spending on legal aid for low-income persons on a
national scale also seems unlikely. State and local bar organizations and
legal aid will continue their laudable efforts along these lines, of course,
but it is unlikely that they will meet the unmet needs of low- and moderate-income persons.94
There are some interesting possibilities on the horizon, however.
89. BAUMOL, supra note 64, at 27.
90. See, e.g., Stan Keillor et al., The Inevitable, if Untrumpeted, March Toward “Civil
Gideon,” 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 469, 474 (2014) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s approach to the
issue as not recognizing that “the right to counsel [is] not just an incremental additional procedural
safeguard” of individual rights because “American government is lawyer-dominated and
litigious”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., If We Don’t Get Civil Gideon: Trying to Make the Best of the
Civil-Justice Market, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 347–56 (2010) (arguing for market-oriented
alternatives to civil Gideon).
91. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Noam Scheiber, The Case for
Socialized Law, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116424/
socialized-law-radical-solution-inequality.
92. In 2012, San Francisco established a local “right to civil council.” See Mike Rosen,
Testing Civil Gideon, CAL. LAWYER (June 2012), https://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=
201206&eid=922767&evid=1. More information about the pilot program can be found on the
website of the Bar Association of San Francisco, http://www.sfbar.org/jdc/legal-services/rtcc/
right-to-civil-counsel-pilot-program.aspx.
93. The Fordham Urban Law Journal held a symposium in fall 2013 entitled, Until Civil
Gideon: Expanding Access to Justice. The panels can be accessed at http://urbanlawjournal.com/
until-civil-gideon/.
94. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 90, at 347 (“During my service [as president of a local Legal
Services Corporation] it became clear to me how unlikely it is, I would guess even with a more
liberal President and Congress, that leading sources of civil legal services . . . will ever fill more
than a modest or moderate fraction of the perceived needs.”).
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Technology may provide some hope.95 Already, following the leadership of Judge Weinstein, the state and federal courts provide many
resources to self-represented litigants,96 many of which are free and
available on the Internet. But we are probably only at the beginning of
technology’s potential to transform the legal market.97 Automation may
yet hold the key to providing for effective self-representation.
Judge Weinstein once commented “that the courts were ‘really not
busy enough.’”98 If automation and technology have the potential to service the “latent legal market,”99 then the good judge may someday get
his wish.

95. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY,
JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE (2000).
96. For a useful summary of federal efforts, see DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., ASSISTANCE TO
PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND
CHIEF JUDGES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file/
proseusdc.pdf.
97. For a tour d’horizon of the growing literature on this topic, see generally Daniel Martin
Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing
for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). This is not
to say that there are not legal and ethical impediments to some possible transformations. See, e.g.,
Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5
(2012) (“Lawyer discipline and professional conduct rules that forbid corporations from owning
or investing in a law firm or law practice . . . compromise[ ] access to the law.”) (citation omitted).
98. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 196.
99. Susskind calls the unmet legal needs of low- and moderate-income persons “the latent
legal market.” See SUSSKIND, supra note 95, at 113.
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